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T T ILL Construction. During 1984 the Texas Supreme Court dealt1/1 with the difficult issue of inheritance rights of adopted children in
r IF the somewhat unusual context of adult adoption. The court de-
cided the issue, however, on a narrow ground of will construction. Under
the facts of Lehman v. Corpus Christi National Bank' W.F.L. Lehman died
on July 27, 1970, leaving a will dated May 4, 1966. The will provided for the
creation of a trust, from which one-fourth of the income was payable to
Melvin Lehman, son of W.F.L. Lehman. Melvin died survived by a natural
son, Keith, and a son Randy adopted on August 24, 1978, at the age of
twenty-six. On Melvin's death, his income interest in the trust was to pass to
his "descendants," a term the will defined to include "the children of the
person designated, and the issue of such children, and such children and
issue shall always include those who are adopted." '2
The question in dispute was whether the adult adoption of Randy Lehman
had the effect of making him an income beneficiary under the terms of the
will of W.F.L. Lehman. The court of appeals held that it did not. 3 The
court pointed out that a will is to be construed by the law as it existed at the
date of death of the testator and acknowledged that an adopted child was
entitled to inherit from and through the adoptive parents at the time of
W.F.L. Lehman's death, as well as at present.4 At the time of W.F.L. Leh-
man's death, however, the relevant statute provided that an adopted adult
inherited from the adoptive parent,5 but no corresponding provision existed
for inheriting through the adoptive parent. 6 Because Randy Lehman was an
adult at the time of his adoption, he could not inherit under the will of
* B.A., LL.B., University of Virginia. Attorney at Law, Thompson & Knight, Dallas,
Texas. The author gratefully acknowledges the invaluable assistance of his associate, Russell
G. Gully.
1. 668 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. 1984). The facts are set forth in the appellate court decision,
Lehman v. Corpus Christi Nat'l Bank, 665 S.W.2d 799, 800 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1983).
2. Randy was the son by a previous marriage of Melvin Lehman's widow. 668 S.W.2d at
688.
3. 665 S.W.2d 799, 801 (Tex. App-Corpus Christi 1983), rev'd, 668 S.W.2d 687 (Tex.
1984).
4. 665 S.W.2d at 800.
5. Act adopting Title 2 of the Family Code, ch. 543, § 1, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 1411,
1432, repealed by Act of June 19, 1975, ch. 476, § 43, 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws 1253, 1270.
6. The legislature amended the statute in 1975 to make adopted adults the children of
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W.F.L. Lehman, and therefore Keith was entitled to his father's interest in
the testamentary trust.
The Texas Supreme Court, in reversing the lower court's decision, de-
clined to look to outside law because it found the will itself to be clear.7 The
definition of "descendants" in the will drew no age distinction between natu-
ral and adopted children, and it unambiguously covered Randy Lehman.8
The court stated that, as indicated by the Texas Family Code,9 an adopted
adult is a child of his parents by adoption for every purpose.' 0 Keith Leh-
man claimed that the trial court erred in excluding the testimony of the
attorney who prepared W.F.L. Lehman's will. On a bill of exceptions, the
attorney said that, in his opinion, W.F.L. Lehman did not intend to include
adopted adults within the class of descendants. The bill of exceptions also
showed, however, that the attorney did not discuss with the testator the
question of adopted adults. The supreme court upheld this decision of the
trial court for two reasons. First, Keith Lehman wanted to use extrinsic
evidence to show that his grandfather would not have intended Randy Leh-
man to be incJuded, in spite of the fact that the literal terms of the will
covered Randy." Second, Texas courts have long held in other contexts
that a witness cannot testify to the state of mind of another person.' 2
In construing wills, the courts will exclude extrinsic evidence unless the
document is ambiguous. In Unitarian Universalist Service v. Lebrecht 13 the
dispute concerned the use of a semicolon in the first codicil to Gertrude L.
Vogt's will that raised a question as to whether the appellant charity was
entitled to a share of the residue. The trial court granted the appellant's
motion in limine, which denied the appellees the opportunity to introduce
extrinsic evidence to show the decedent's intent.' 4 The trial court ruled, and
both sides argued, that the will and codicil were unambiguous, but the appel-
late court disagreed after discussing several possible interpretations of the
codicil.' 5 The court noted that, in the absence of ambiguity, a will is con-
strued within the four corners of the document and that codicil and will
must be construed together and interpreted as if both had been executed on
the date of the codicil. 16 In reading the two instruments together the court
their adoptive parents "for all purposes." TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.55 (Vernon Pam.
Supp. 1975-1985).
7. 668 S.W.2d at 689.
8. Id. The court viewed the position taken by Keith Lehman as a form of the "stranger
to the adoption" rule, which had been rejected in Texas. Id.
9. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.55 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1975-1985).
10. 668 S.W.2d at 689. The court referred, however, to the 1975 version of the statute,
rather than the amended language. See supra note 6.
11. 668 S.W.2d at 689.
12. Id. (citing Graves v. Campbell, 74 Tex. 576, 580, 12 S.W. 238, 239-40 (1889); Taylor
v. Lewis, 553 S.W.2d 153, 161 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
13. 670 S.W.2d 402 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
14. The appellees attempted to condition consideration of their cross-point on the event
that the court of appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court. The appellate court found
no authority permitting a conditional appeal and considered the cross-point for all purposes.
Id. at 403.




found the will and codicil of Gertrude L. Vogt to be susceptible to more than
one meaning.' 7 The court held that extrinsic evidence was therefore admis-
sible to show the decedent's intent and reversed and remanded for a new
trial. 181
Testamentary Capacity and Undue Influence. The Texas Supreme Court
continues to wrestle with questions concerning capacity and undue influ-
ence. Croucher v. Croucher19 involved a will contest based on lack of testa-
mentary capacity. James Croucher, Sr. executed his will on July 7, 1980,
and died from a stroke about six weeks afterwards. 20 Mrs. Croucher, the
sole devisee under his will, produced some evidence at trial that Mr.
Croucher had testamentary capacity on July 7, 1980, but the jury found to
the contrary. The question on appeal was whether Mrs. Croucher had estab-
lished as a matter of law that her husband had testamentary capacity on the
day he executed his will. Thus, the appellate court had to determine
whether appellees, the testator's sons from a prior marriage, produced some
evidence that their father was not competent to make a will.
The Texas Supreme Court noted that no direct evidence indicated that
Mr. Croucher lacked testamentary capacity on July 7. Evidence of incapac-
ity at other times, however, could be used to establish incapacity on the date
the will was executed if it demonstrated that the condition was persistent
and had some probability of being the same condition in effect when the will
was executed. 2 1 The court posed two tests that evidence adduced by the
Croucher sons had to pass. First, was the evidence of the kind that would
indicate lack of testamentary capacity? Some evidence showed that at times
during 1980 Mr. Croucher was confused and his memory was sketchy. A
physician testified that the occlusions could cause Mr. Croucher to be less
than lucid at times. The court, therefore, concluded that the evidence was
indeed of the kind that would indicate lack of testamentary capacity. 22 Sec-
ond, the court asked whether that evidence was probative of Mr. Croucher's
capacity, or lack thereof, on the day the will was executed. Mr. Croucher's
physical problems were shown to have existed in March and August of 1980,
from which a jury could have inferred that he lacked testamentary capacity
on July 7. Mr. Croucher had a failing memory resulting from his arterio-
sclerosis in March, before the will was executed. That same disease incapac-
itated him in August, after the will was made. The court therefore
concluded that the evidence was probative of Mr. Croucher's lack of capac-
ity on the day of execution. 23 The court thus held that Mrs. Croucher had
not established as a matter of law that her husband had testamentary capac-
17. Id. at 404-05.
18. Id. at 405.
19. 660 S.W.2d 55 (Tex. 1983).
20. The testator executed the will in question during a series of physical problems that
stemmed from diabetes and eventually led to the total occlusion of his right carotid artery and
the partial occlusion of his left carotid artery.
21. Id. (quoting Lee v. Lee, 424 S.W.2d 609, 611 (Tex. 1968)).




ity on July 7, 1980.24
The decision in Lowery v. Saunders25 resolved a will contest based on
grounds of lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence. Bessie Cooke
Cato, the testatrix, died on January 9, 1980, leaving several executed wills
and codicils. The appellee was the primary beneficiary of a will dated April
7, 1976, and a codicil thereto. The will appellant offered for probate was
executed on June 18, 1979, and eliminated appellee as a devisee and legatee.
The trial court refused to admit the 1979 instrument to probate, ruling that
the testatrix lacked testamentary capacity at the time of its execution and
that appellant had exercised undue influence over her.
26
The court of appeals first addressed the argument relating to testamentary
capacity. 27 The court rejected the appellant's contention that no legally and
factually sufficient evidence supported the trial court's conclusion that the
testatrix did not have testamentary capacity. 28 A psychiatrist had examined
the testatrix before the will was executed. He filed an affidavit stating his
belief that the testatrix had sufficient mental capacity to execute a will. On
cross-examination of the psychiatrist, however, the appellee was able to
demonstrate that the testatrix was not knowledgeable about the nature and
extent of her property at the time she saw the psychiatrist and her attorney.
During the psychiatrist's examination, the testatrix had described a house
containing a piano, and she alluded to a small business from which she drew
a monthly income and to ownership of stocks and bonds. Both the piano
and the business had been sold sometime before the examination. No evi-
dence indicated she ever owned any interest in securities. In addition, she
stated that as her next of kin she had three nieces, one nephew, and one
grandniece, but in fact she had two grandnieces, two nephews, and a grand-
nephew as next of kin.
The court next addressed the argument relating to undue influence. 29 The
court held that the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support
the trial court's findings and conclusion that the testatrix was acting under
24. Id. at 58.
25. 666 S.W.2d 226 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
26. The court of appeals remarked that the trial court's holdings were conflicting. The
appellate court noted that testamentary incapacity implies a lack of intelligent mental power,
whereas undue influence implies existence of testamentary capacity, albeit subjected to a domi-
nant influence. Id. at 229 n.2.
27. The court defined testamentary capacity as having "sufficient mental ability, at the
time of the execution of the will, to understand the business in which the testatrix is engaged,
the effect of her act in making the will, and the general nature and extent of her property.
Moreover, the testatrix must also be able to know her next of kin and the natural objects of her
bounty." Id. at 232. The testatrix must also be able to understand what the elements of the
business to be transacted are and their obvious relation to each other, as well as be able to form
a reasonable judgment as to them. The will proponent has the burden of proving that the
testator had testamentary capacity. Id. at 232.
28. Id. at 233.
29. The court defined undue influence as "that dominion acquired by one person over the
mind of another, which prevents the latter from exercising his discretion, which destroys his
free agency, and which compels him to do something against his will from fear, or from a
desire of peace, or from some feeling that he is unable to resist." Id. at 234. The party oppos-
ing or contesting probate of the will has the burden of proving undue influence. Id.
[Vol. 39
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undue influence at the time she executed the 1979 will.30 The testatrix's
attorney testified that the appellant had instructed him on how to draft the
will, that the appellant was present when the will was executed, and that the
attorney had never seen the testatrix alone. The psychiatrist testified that
the appellant had paid him for his services. The appellant testified that he
had access to the testatrix's house and had a key to the house. The court of
appeals concluded that this evidence was sufficient to support the trial
court's finding that the appellant had exerted undue influence over the
testatrix.31
Forfeiture Clause. Texas courts have not decided directly whether an excep-
tion to the enforceability of forfeiture clauses should exist when the contest-
ant acts in good faith and with probable cause. A Texas court has now
indicated a probable result. Under the facts of Gunter v. Pogue32 Gerald and
Beryl Gunter offered for probate as the last will of Eldon Johnson a will
dated November 28, 1979. JoAnn Pogue, William Otten, and Beryl
Katchmazenski filed a will contest and offered for probate a will dated Janu-
ary 14, 1977. The Gunters opposed the probate of this will and offered alter-
natively wills dated March 2, 1978, and July 8, 1977. Following a jury trial,
the July 1977 will was admitted to probate, and the Gunters were appointed
co-independent executors. The will admitted to probate contained a forfei-
ture clause under which anyone who contested the will was to receive only
ten dollars instead of the property given to that person under the will. The
Gunters informed the other three individuals that as a result of their contest
they would receive only the ten dollars specified by the forfeiture clause.
These three then filed a motion to remove the Gunters as independent execu-
tors and, alternatively, a motion to compel the Gunters to distribute the
assets of the estate without regard to the forfeiture provision. The trial court
ordered the independent executors to distribute the property and assets of
the estate disregarding the forfeiture clause, and the Gunters appealed the
order.
The appellate court recognized the general rule that forfeiture provisions
are to be construed strictly and that a breach of such a clause should be
declared only when the acts of the parties come within the express terms of
the clause. 33 After reviewing relevant case law, the appellate court indicated
that Texas courts, given the proper circumstances, would and probably
should adopt a good faith and probable cause exception. 34 The court dis-
posed of the case without deciding the issue, however, stating that if the
30. Id. at 235.
31. Id.
32. 672 S.W.2d 840 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
33. Id. at 842.
34. Id. at 843. The court noted that some jurisdictions had allowed a good faith and
probable cause exception to defeat a forfeiture clause and that while Texas courts have upheld
the validity of forfeiture clauses, they have not referred to an exception for good faith and
probable cause. The court further noted that no Texas cases had ruled directly on the issue of
whether the good faith and probable cause exception to a forfeiture clause would be applied in
Texas. Id. at 843.
1985]
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appellees had sought to defeat the forfeiture clause, they would have had the
burden to come forward with proof that their original actions of contest
were based on good faith and with probable cause. 35 The record contained
no evidence indicating that the contest of the will admitted to probate was
brought in good faith and upon probable cause. As a result, the appellate
court reversed and remanded the case. 36
Joint Will. Joint wills are a fruitful source of disputes. Wiemers v.
Wiemers37 is typical. Norma Wiemers and her three children brought a
declaratory judgment action to determine whether the George H. Wiemers
and Ida G. Wiemers joint will was contractual and irrevocable. Norma was
the widow of Wesley C. Wiemers, one of the sons of George and Ida.
George died on January 27, 1960, and the 1951 joint will was probated. Ida
executed a new will on May 16, 1972, which attempted to revoke the joint
will. Under the joint will, George and Ida intended the survivor of them to
have a life estate in their real property, and they agreed that Wesley would
have the remainder interest in the homestead provided he paid $500 to his
siblings. Ida left none of her property to Wesley in her 1972 will. In 1980
Wesley predeceased his mother, who died on September 16, 1981.
The trial court held that the will was not contractual, and the court of
appeals affirmed, but the Texas Supreme Court reversed those decisions.38
The court recognized that section 59A of the Probate Code, which calls for
an express recital that a contract exists as a prerequisite of a contractual
will, 39 applied only to wills executed on or after September 1, 1979.40 The
court then observed that a primary characteristic of a joint and contractual
will is a comprehensive plan for a disposition of all property owned by both
parties.4' The court concluded that the will at issue contained such a plan
and held that Norma Wiemers was entitled to the constructive trust she
requested. 42
Codicil. The issue in Hoffman v. Irizarry43 involved the effect of an alleged
clerical error made during the drafting of a codicil. Upon the death of Ma-
bel Laura Keller three testamentary instruments were filed for probate: a
will dated April 20, 1976; a will dated June 21, 1976, which revoked all
earlier wills; and a codicil dated April 12, 1977. References in the codicil
were to the April 20 will, rather than the more recent June 21 will. The
testatrix's attorney testified at trial that the testatrix intended the codicil to
35. Id. at 844.
36. Id. at 845.
37. 683 S.W.2d 355 (Tex. 1984).
38. Id. at 356.
39. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 59A(a) (Vernon 1980) provides: "A contract to make a
will or devise, or not to revoke a will or devise, if executed or entered into on or after Septem-
ber 1, 1979, can be established only by provisions of a will stating that a contract does exist and
stating the material provisions of the contract."
40. 683 S.W.2d at 356.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 357. Section 59A of the Probate Code should reduce disputes in this area.
43. 673 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, writ dism'd).
[Vol. 39
WILLS AND TRUSTS
refer to and modify the June 21 will and that the references to April 20 were
a result of errors made by his legal assistant. The jury accepted this testi-
mony, and the trial court admitted the codicil to probate as a modification of
the June 21 will.
The parties appealing the trial court's judgment contended not that the
codicil was intended to republish the April 20 will, but that the codicil
should not have been admitted to probate because it showed no intent on its
face to modify the June 21 will. The court of appeals interpreted their argu-
ment to mean that the codicil should be treated as a nullity, from which it
would follow that in executing the codicil the testatrix performed an empty
and useless act.44 According to the court, the law would not presume that
the testatrix intended a useless act, particularly when the codicil did not
contradict or create an ambiguity in the June 21 will, but instead could be
read in harmony with it.4 1 The court concluded that whether the testatrix
intended the codicil to refer to and modify the June 21 will was a question of
fact and, therefore, that extrinsic evidence was admissible to aid the jury's
determination. 46 Thus the appellate court refused to overturn the decision
of the trial court.
4 7
Ademption. In Bates v. Fuller48 Sara Helen Bates and Fay Ellen Gleaton
sued their sister, Carolyn Fuller, and her son, Thomas Michael Fuller, in the
Fullers' capacities as co-independent executors of the estate of Pearla S.
Coffman, mother of the three sisters. The action in part sought construction
of the decedent's will. In response to one of the issues the trial court ruled
that the bequest to Sarah Bates and Fay Gleaton in their mother's will was
adeemed by the sale of certain property during the lifetime of Pearla
Coffman. The relevant provision of Pearla Coffman's will provided that if
she owned any real estate on the date of her death, such real estate was to be
sold to pay for all legally enforceable debts, funeral expenses, all costs of last
illness, administration expenses, and any federal estate taxes. After payment
of these debts, expenses, and taxes, the balance of the proceeds was to be
divided equally among the three sisters. If the testatrix owned no real estate
at the time of her death, however, the debts, expenses, and taxes were to be
paid from the residue of the estate, which was bequeathed to Carolyn Fuller.
The court of appeals first held that the bequest at issue was a specific or
special bequest, rather than demonstrative or general. 4 9 Consequently, the
bequest was subject to the operation of the general ademption rule, which
provides that if the subject matter of a special bequest or devise is not a part
of the testator's estate at the time of death, the bequest is adeemed unless a
contrary intention is expressed in the will.50 Upon examining the specific




48. 663 S.W.2d 512 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1983, no writ).
49. Id. at 515.
50. Id. (citing Shriner's Hosp. for Crippled Children v. Stahl, 610 S.W.2d 147, 148 (Tex.
19851
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language in the will, the court found that the testatrix intended to make a
bequest of the cash proceeds from the sale of the real property remaining in
her estate after the payment of the debts, expenses, and taxes.51 The net
proceeds from the sale of the Coffman home had been deposited in a separate
savings account and were on hand in that account at the time of Mrs.
Coffman's death. The court held that the bequest of sale proceeds was not
adeemed by the sale since the proceeds were an identifiable part of the estate
at the time of death, but that the operation of the general ademption rule
would have resulted in an ademption if the proceeds had not been traceable
at the time of death.52 The appellate court therefore reversed that part of the
trial court's judgment holding that the bequest was adeemed.53
Doctrine of Election. The trespass to try title suit in Smith v. Smith54 in-
volved primarily the doctrine of election. The trial court awarded title to a
170.89-acre tract of land to the plaintiffs, and the defendants sought reversal
of the judgment. Plaintiffs claimed title to the land under the will of James
E. Smith, Sr., who allegedly received the remainder interest in the tract of
land in question under the will of his mother, Lois McHugh Smith. Defend-
ants claimed title under a deed of gift executed by Blackstone L. Smith, Sr.,
surviving husband of Lois McHugh Smith; Blackstone Smith had died
before this suit was filed. Lois Smith's will left all of her real property to her
husband, Blackstone Sr. The will devised to her son, James Sr., subject to
the life estate to Blackstone Sr., the remainder interest in the 170.89-acre
tract of land in dispute. In addition, the will left to Blackstone Sr. Lois
Smith's personal property and a life estate in and all revenues from certain
separate property of hers in Pecos County. The parties to the litigation
agreed that the 170.89-acre tract of land at issue was the separate property of
Blackstone Sr.55 Plaintiffs contended that Blackstone Sr. elected to take
under the will and that, therefore, neither he nor defendants could properly
assert that Lois Smith's will did not effectively dispose of the real estate that
was the separate property of Blackstone Sr. 56
The court of appeals found it impossible to read the will in its entirety
without being forced to the conclusion that Lois Smith attempted to give to
her son James Sr. an interest in the land owned as separate property by
1980)). The court noted several discussions of the ademption rule by authorities in the field.
663 S.W.2d at 516.
51. 663 S.W.2d at 515.
52. Id. at 516.
53. Id.
54. 657 S.W.2d 457 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, no writ).
55. Evidence in the trial court established that Blackstone Sr. accepted the benefits of the
will by taking possession of personal property and accepting royalties from oil-producing lands
that had been Lois Smith's separate property. Id. at 461.
56. Under the doctrine of election, if Lois Smith attempted to devise the separate property
of Blackstone Sr., over which she legally had no control, and he accepted under her will bene-
fits he otherwise would not have had, then he is estopped from challenging her will as an
effective disposition of his property. The principle is that a person cannot take benefits under a




Blackstone Sr.57 Regardless of whether she mistakenly believed that the
land in question was community property, the doctrine of election came into
operation because the will permitted no conclusion other than that she in-
tended to dispose of land that she did not own.58 The defendants pointed
out, however, that any election by Blackstone Sr. could not stand unless
evidence supported a finding that he had knowledge of the extent of the
estate and of his duty to choose between inconsistent rights and that he in-
tended to make an election as shown by his words and acts. The court of
appeals found evidence in the record that supported the existence of these
prerequisites. 59 The appellate court therefore affirmed the trial court's deci-
sion, holding that the doctrine of election operated to preclude the defend-
ants from claiming an interest in the tract at issue. 60
Standing to Contest a Will. The decision in Plummer v. Roberson6l permits
the party named as executor in a decedent's will to contest a later will of the
decedent even though that party has no other interest in either will. The
decision stemmed from the death of Ada M. Moore on January 3, 1979.
Altemeta Roberson, who was named independent executrix in Ada Moore's
1977 will, filed that will for probate in the county court of Fayette County.
After Biffy Poole filed a will contest, the probate proceeding was transferred
to the district court of Fayette County. Matthew W. Plummer likewise filed
a will of Ada M. Moore for probate in the Fayette County court. This will
was dated October 10, 1968, and named Plummer as executor. The county
court transferred this probate application to the district court of Fayette
County, and the district court consolidated the two proceedings.
Before a trial on the merits took place the district court granted a motion
to dismiss Plummer's claim for lack of standing. After the dismissal Rober-
son and Poole settled their differences, and the district court admitted the
1977 will to probate. On appeal Plummer complained that the district court
erred in dismissing him for want of interest. The court of appeals recognized
that section 10 of the Probate Code provides that any person interested in an
estate may contest any issue before that issue is determined by the court.62
As defined in section 3(r) of the Probate Code, "interested persons" are
"heirs, devisees, spouses, creditors, or any others having a property right in,
57. Id. at 460.
58. Id.
59. The court pointed out that Blackstone Sr. acquired the land in question by inheri-
tance, so he could not be heard to say that he did not know the land was his property. Black-
stone Sr. acted as executor of Lois Smith's estate and accepted benefits under the will, so he
had to have been familiar with the will's contents. Finally, the court stated that if Blackstone
Sr. accepted benefits of the will while remaining ignorant of the material facts, elementary
equitable considerations would require that he surrender the benefits he had received. Id. at
461.
60. Id. at 462.
61. 666 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. App.-Austin 1984, writ refd n.r.e.).
62. Id. at 657. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 10 (Vernon 1980) provides: "Any person inter-
ested in an estate may, at any time before any issue in any proceeding is decided upon by the
court, file opposition thereto in writing and shall be entitled to process for witnesses and evi-
dence, and to be heard upon such opposition, as in other suits."
1985)
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or a claim against, the estate being administered. ' 63 Even though Plummer
did not plead that he was an heir, devisee, spouse, or creditor of Ada Moore,
or that he had a property right in or a claim against her estate, the appellate
court concluded that the district court should not have dismissed Plummer
from the proceeding.6" The appellate court held that Probate Code sections
7565 and 76,66 independent of section 10, empowered Plummer, as named
executor, to apply for probate of the 1968 will.67 Plummer's application for
probate of the 1968 will as executor, without more, was sufficient to permit
him to remain in the proceeding. 68
II. TRUSTS
Texas Trust Code. Extensive revisions in the statutory trust laws of Texas
became effective on January 1, 1984. These revisions are contained in the
new Texas Trust Code, codified in chapters 111-115 of title 9 of the Property
Code. 69 The Trust Code retains many of the substantive provisions of its
predecessor, the Texas Trust Act, 70 and adds provisions relating to topics
that have become more important in recent years.7 1
The general provisions of Chapter 111 describe the applicability of the
Trust Code. In case of any conflict between the Trust Code and the terms of
a trust, the trust terms control except that the settlor may not relieve a cor-
porate trustee of the duties, restrictions, and liabilities under sections
113.052 and 113.053, which prohibit certain self-dealing activities.72 The
Trust Code is to be considered an amendment of the Trust Act for purposes
of any instrument that refers to the Trust Act.73 The Trust Code covers
express trusts only, and not resulting trusts, constructive trusts, business
trusts, or security instruments.74 Common law rules continue to prevail ex-
cept as the Trust Code alters those rules. 75 The Trust Code governs all
trusts created on or after January 1, 1984, and all transactions occurring on
63. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 3(r) (Vernon 1980).
64. 666 S.W.2d at 657.
65. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 75 (Vernon 1980) provides: "Upon receiving notice of a
death of a testator, the person having custody of the testator's will shall deliver it to the clerk
of the court which has jurisdiction of the estate."
66. Id. § 76 provides: "An executor named in a will or any interested person may make
application to the court of a proper county: (a) For an order admitting a will to probate ....
(b) For the appointment of the executor named in the will."
67. 666 S.W.2d at 658.
68. Id.
69. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 111.001-115.017 (Vernon 1984).
70. Texas Trust Act, ch. 148, 1943 Tex. Gen. Laws 232, repealed by Act of May 25, 1983,
ch. 567, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 3269.
71. For discussion of the Trust Code see STATE BAR OF TEXAS, GUIDE TO THE TEXAS
TRUST CODE (1983); Cawley, Probate Litigation, in ADVANCED ESTATE PLANNING AND
PROBATE COURSE at T (1984); Jenson, Texas Trust Code-Determination of Income and Prin-
cipal, in ADVANCED ESTATE PLANNING AND PROBATE COURSE at S (1984); McMahan,
Texas Trust Code-Powers and Duties of Trustees, in ADVANCED ESTATE PLANNING AND
PROBATE COURSE at R (1984).
72. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 111.002(a) (Vernon 1984).
73. Id. § 111.002(b).
74. Id. § 111.003.
75. Id. § 111.005.
(Vol. 39
WILLS AND TRUSTS
or after that date relating to trusts created earlier. 76
Chapter 112 of the Trust Code governs the creation, validity, modifica-
tion, and termination of trusts. The provisions of this chapter are largely
consistent with prior Texas law under the Trust Act and Texas court deci-
sions. Many of its new provisions are based upon the Restatement (Second)
of Trusts.77 Unlike the Trust Act, the Trust Code generally requires written
evidence of the trust terms for the creation of trusts of personal property,
78
although this requirement does not extend to two types of trusts of personal
property. First, no writing is required to create a trust of personal property
when that property is transferred to a trustee who is neither settlor nor bene-
ficiary if the transferor simultaneously expresses the intention to create a
trust. 79 Second, a trust of personal property is enforceable if the owner of
such property declares in writing that he holds the property as trustee for
another or for the owner and another as beneficiary.80
Chapter 113 of the Trust Code regarding administration of trusts borrows
heavily from the Trust Act. The chapter generally expands the powers of a
trustee and clarifies a trustee's power to act in previously uncertain circum-
stances. A corporate trustee may deposit funds with itself as a permanent
investment if authorized by the terms of the trust. 81 A beneficiary currently
eligible to receive distributions from a trust created before January 1, 1984,
may authorize such a deposit. 82 A trustee is authorized to participate in a
business, including a proprietorship, partnership, limited partnership, corpo-
ration, or association.83 The Trust Code grants expanded powers to a
trustee to manage mineral properties and the surface estate of real prop-
erty.84 A trustee may now purchase insurance to protect itself and the trust
property.8 5 The Trust Code enlarges a trustee's power to borrow by permit-
ting it to borrow from itself.86 In addition, the Trust Code contains an en-
tirely new provision permitting distributions to minors and incapacitated
beneficiaries if such distributions are made (1) to the beneficiary directly,
76. Id. § 111.006.
77. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS (1957).
78. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 112.004 (Vernon 1984).
79. Id.
80. Id. Other provisions of chapter 112 are also notable. The chapter approves additions
of property to an existing trust unless prohibited by the terms of the trust or unless the prop-
erty is unacceptable to the trustee. Id. § 112.006. See also id. § 113.004 (providing that a
trustee may receive from any source additions to the assets of the trust). A corporate trustee,
before it may serve, must have the power to act as trustee in Texas. Id. § 112.008(a). In an
adaptation of TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 37A (Vernon 1980), one provision permits a benefici-
ary to disclaim in a prescribed manner an entire or partial interest in a trust if the beneficiary
has not accepted any benefits therefrom. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 112.010 (Vernon 1984).
In a departure from RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 330 (1957), which requires that
the power of revocation be reserved, the Trust Code continues the Texas position that a trust is
revocable unless expressly made irrevocable. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 112.051(a) (Vernon
1984).
81. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 113.007, .057 (Vernon 1984).
82. Id. § 113.057(a).
83. Id. § 113.008.
84. Id. §§ 113.009, .012.
85. Id. § 113.013.
86. Id. § 113.015.
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(2) to the beneficiary's guardian or estate, (3) for the health, support, mainte-
nance, or education of the beneficiary, (4) to a custodian under the Uniform
Gifts to Minors Act,8 7 or (5) by reimbursement of the person actually caring
for the beneficiary.88 Also, the Trust Code makes clear that a trustee may
comply with the terms of a written executory contract signed by the set-
tlor.8 9 This exception to the general prohibition against self-dealing avoids
some of the problems that have occurred as a result of section 352 of the
Probate Code. 90 Finally, the new code reenacts the prudent person rule of
the Trust Act.9 '
The Trust Code carries forward the concept that allocations between in-
come and principal are to be made in accordance with the statute unless the
trust instrument contains a contrary provision.92 The new statutory provi-
sions allocating trust principal and income are based on the Revised Uni-
form Principal and Income Act (1962). 93 Unlike the Trust Act, which had
set forth specific accounting methods to be used in determining the net prof-
its of a business or farming operation, 94 the Trust Code simply provides that
generally accepted accounting principles are to be determinative in such cal-
culations.9 5 Former accounting methods, however, are not necessarily pre-
cluded. The Trust Code also prescribes the proper allocation of production
payments from mineral properties, 96 but no longer provides for a specific
allocation of gross proceeds from the sale of timber to principal, 97 instead
placing the allocation within the discretion of the trustee. 98 Lastly, the
trustee's compensation is to be allocated between income and principal in a
manner that the trustee, in its discretion, determines to be just and
equitable. 99
Chapter 114 sets forth the liabilities, rights, and remedies of trustees, ben-
eficiaries, and third persons. The trustee is not liable to a beneficiary for a
loss in value or failure to make a profit unless a breach of trust has oc-
curred. 100 The Trust Code describes circumstances under which a successor
87. UNIF. GiFrS TO MINORS ACT, 8A U.L.A. 317 (1966).
88. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 113.021 (Vernon 1984).
89. Id. § 113.053(e)(1).
90. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 352 (Vernon 1980); see Furr v. Hall, 553 S.W.2d 666, 671
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (co-executors forbidden from selling stock of
the estate to corporations of which they were officers); 7-Up Bottling Co. v. Capital Nat'l
Bank, 505 S.W.2d 624, 626-27 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1974, writ refd n.r.e.) (fiduciary who
purchased stock of the estate pursuant to option granted by decedent adjudged of self-dealing).
91. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 113.056 (Vernon 1984). The prudent person rule as set
forth in the Texas Trust Act required that, with respect to investments, the trustee "exercise
the judgment and care under the circumstances then prevailing, which men of ordinary pru-
dence, discretion, and intelligence exercise in the management of their own affairs .... Act
to amend Trust Act, ch. 77, § 13, 1945 Tex. Gen. Laws 109, 113 (repealed 1983).
92. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 113.010 (Vernon 1984).
93. UNIF. PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT, 7A U.L.A. 429 (1952).
94. Texas Trust Act, ch. 148, §§ 31-32, 1943 Tex. Gen. Laws 232, 242-43 (repealed 1983).
95. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 113.106 (Vernon 1984).
96. Id. § 113.107(c).
97. See Texas Trust Act, ch. 148, § 33, 1943 Tex. Gen. Laws 232, 243 (repealed 1983).
98. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 113.108 (Vernon 1984).
99. Id. § 113.111.
100. Id. § 114.001(b).
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trustee will be liable for a predecessor's breach of trust.10 1 If a beneficiary
has incurred a liability to the trust, the trustee has a right of offset notwith-
standing any spendthrift provision of the trust. 10 2 The Code expressly au-
thorizes the payment of "reasonable compensation" to a trustee absent trust
terms to the contrary. 10 3 In certain circumstances, collection under a suit
against the trustee in his representative capacity may be had directly from
the trust property. 104
The jurisdiction and venue provisions of chapter 115 follow the corre-
sponding provision in the Trust Act. 105 Unlike the Trust Act, however, the
Trust Code, under the concept of virtual representation, enumerates situa-
tions in which persons will be bound by an order binding another. 0 6 To the
extent no conflict of interest exists, an order binding a guardian binds the
ward, an order binding a trustee binds the beneficiaries in certain proceed-
ings, a parent may represent his minor child as guardian ad litem or as next
friend, and an unborn or unascertained person is bound to the extent his
interest is adequately represented by another party in the proceeding. 107
Removal of Trustee. In Akin v. Dahl0 8 the Texas Supreme Court demon-
strated a reluctance to remove a settlor-trustee on account of disputes with a
beneficiary. George Dahl was trustee of a discretionary trust created by his
late wife. The beneficiaries under the trust included Dahl, his daughter,
Gloria Dahl Akin, her husband Ted Akin, the children of the Akins, and the
children's spouses. The trust instrument provided that trust income and
corpus would go to the trustee and that disbursements to the other benefi-
ciaries would be at the discretion of the trustee. Hostility developed between
Dahl and the other beneficiaries when the Akins brought guardianship and
incompetency proceedings against Dahl. He countered with a malicious
prosecution suit against them, and the Akins sued to remove Dahl as trustee.
Based on a jury finding that Dahl had developed such hostility toward Glo-
ria Akin and the Akin children that his decisions would probably be influ-
enced adversely, the trial court removed Dahl as trustee. 109
Before the Texas Supreme Court) Gloria Akin urged that section 39 of the
Trust Act 110 permitted the removal of a trustee at the discretion of the trial
court and that review of the trial court's action should be governed by the
101. Id. § 114.002.
102. Id. § 114.031(b).
103. Id. § 114.061.
104. Id. §§ 114.083, .084.
105. Compare id. § 115.001 (jurisdiction) and id. § 115.002 (venue) with Texas Trust Act,
ch. 148, § 24, 1943 Tex. Gen. Laws 232, 238-39 (relating to the jurisdiction and venue of
actions pertaining to trusts) (repealed 1983).
106. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 115.013 (Vernon 1984).
107. Id.
108. 661 S.W.2d 911 (Tex. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1911, 80 L. Ed. 2d 460 (1984).
109. 661 S.W.2d at 913.
110. Texas Trust Act, ch. 148, § 39, 1943 Tex. Gen. Laws 232, 246 (repealed 1983) pro-
vided in part that trustees who materially violated or attempted to violate an express trust
could be removed in the discretion of the court having jurisdiction.
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"arbitrary or unreasonable" standard.11  The court interpreted the section
differently, indicating that the provision was intended to ensure that the
grounds for a trustee's removal not be limited expressly to those enumerated
in the section, but rather might include those that the trial court, in its dis-
cretion, deemed necessary and proper. 112 Since the removal of a trustee is
not a discretionary act of the trial court, the "arbitrary and unreasonable"
standard did not apply.113
Also at issue was the question of whether the jury findings concerning
hostility could justify a trustee's removal. The court stated that before a
trustee could be removed in circumstances such as those at hand, a finding
that the trustee's hostility does or will affect his performance in the office is
necessary.1 14 The jury must decide that the trustee could not properly serve
due to the hostility.1 15 The jury did not make this finding, and consequently
the court held that Dahl could not be removed as trustee. 116 The court as-
serted that it would not sanction the creation of hostility by a beneficiary of a
trust in order to effect the removal of a trustee. 117
Existence of Trust Relationship. A common real estate practice in Texas is
to place title for convenience in an individual as "trustee" without the crea-
tion of any express trust. The practice has long been recognized in the Texas
Trust Act118 and is still recognized in the Texas Trust Code.1 19 The practice
demands care, however, as demonstrated by Corsi v. Nolana Development
Association. 120
In Corsi Nolana Development Association sued Ann R. Corsi for breach
of her fiduciary duties as trustee. The Association, a joint venture composed
of three individuals, owned as its sole asset undeveloped land in Hidalgo
County. As part of a refinancing transaction, the land was placed in the
name of Ann R. Corsi, trustee. Except for a deed of trust she alone signed,
no document recognized the trust or assigned any duties to her as trustee.
Payments on the loan secured by the land fell into default, and eventually
the property was sold at a foreclosure sale. The joint venture then brought
suit for breach of fiduciary duty. The trial court awarded damages to the
Association for the alleged breach.
On appeal Mrs. Corsi argued that she was a trustee in name only, that the
trust was a passive trust, and that no evidence or insufficient evidence
showed that she had any duties with respect to the trust. The court of ap-
peals acknowledged that the mere use of the word "trustee" would not of
111. This standard was held applicable to decisions regarding a trial court's abuse of dis-
cretion in Landry v. Travelers Ins. Co., 458 S.W.2d 649, 651 (Tex. 1970).
112. 661 S.W.2d at 913.
113. Id.




118. Texas Trust Act, ch. 148, § 8, 1943 Tex. Gen. Laws 232, 234 (repealed 1983).
119. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 114.082(a) (Vernon 1984).
120. 674 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, writ granted).
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itself create a trust and that since the trustee was given no affirmative powers
and duties, the trust at issue was "passive or dry."' 21 According to the
court, in such a trust the beneficiary is entitled to actual possession and en-
joyment of the property and is also entitled to dispose of it. 122 Legal title,
not merely an equitable interest, vests immediately in the beneficiary upon
execution of the deed. 123 As a matter of law, therefore, Mrs. Corsi could not
have breached her fiduciary duty to the Association. 124 The appellee re-
sponded that even if an express trust failed, a resulting trust arose. The
court answered that even assuming a resulting trust arose, the evidence was
insufficient to show the terms of the trust or the conditions under which it
arose. 125 The judgment of the court of appeals therefore reversed the trial
court's allowance of recovery against Mrs. Corsi. 126
Otto v. Klement 127 addressed the issue of the admissibility of parol testi-
mony to determine the ownership of deposited funds owned by a decedent.
Lorraine M. Otto owned at the time of her death a checking account and a
savings account, both in the form of a joint tenancy with right of survivor-
ship. Her brother, Harry Joseph Otto, was the only other signatory to these
accounts. The decedent also owned at death a certificate of deposit payable
to "Lorraine Marie Otto or Harry Otto, Trustee." Lorraine Otto died intes-
tate on October 18, 1980, and her sister, Olivia C. Klement, qualified as
administratrix of the estate. Harry Otto sued for a declaration of the owner-
ship of the funds. Over his objections the trial court admitted testimony
bearing on Lorraine Otto's intent in establishing the accounts and her in-
tended distribution of the funds. The testimony indicated that she wished
her assets to be distributed equally among her sisters and brothers. In light
of this testimony the trial court denied Harry Otto the full ownership of the
funds held in the two joint survivorship accounts and in the certificate of
deposit.
Relying on section 439(a) of the Probate Code, 128 which became effective
on August 27, 1979, the appellate court held that the survivor owns all funds
in a joint survivorship account and that a court may not consider evidence of
the depositor's intent of ownership.129 Accordingly, the parol testimony ad-
mitted by the trial court was ineffective to change legal ownership of the
checking and savings account funds, and Harry Otto was entitled to these
funds. 130 Ownership of the certificate of deposit was not so easily resolved,
however. Harry Otto contended that Lorraine Otto made herself a joint ten-
121. Id. at 877-78.
122. Id. at 877.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 878.
125. Id. at 878-79.
126. Id. at 879.
127. 656 S.W.2d 678 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
128. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 439(a) (Vernon 1980) provides that sums that remain on
deposit in a joint account at death belong to the surviving party, if the account is subject to a
written agreement under which the interest of the deceased party is made to survive to the
surviving party.




ant and beneficiary of Harry Otto, by having the certificate issued to "Lor-
raine Marie Otto or Harry Otto, Trustee," and that she thereby created a
trust account of funds that he, as trustee, owned. The court of appeals nev-
ertheless noted that the word "trustee" does not alone give rise to a trust and
pointed out that section 436(14) of the Probate Code' 3' requires that in or-
der for a deposit to become a trust account the trust relationship must be
established by the form of the account and of the deposit agreement with the
depository. 132 The record did not contain any deposit agreement establish-
ing the certificate of deposit as a trust account. The court conceded that the
form of the certificate served to vest some interest and control in Harry Otto,
but it was uncertain whether Lorraine Otto intended to name herself the
beneficiary of Harry Otto and to vest absolute ownership of the funds in him
at death or whether Lorraine Otto intended that Harry Otto as trustee ad-
minister the funds not for himself, but for others at her death. 133 Because of
this ambiguity the court of appeals held that the trial court properly admit-
ted parol evidence to ascertain the correct meaning of the language.134 The
appellate court, therefore, upheld the trial court's determination that Harry
Otto was not entitled to all of the funds represented by the certificate of
deposit. 135
Constructive Trust. In Stout v. Clayton136 O'Neil Stout, the divorced hus-
band of the deceased Lillie Stout, sued as guardian of the estate of their
adopted son, John. The defendants were Lillie's two older sisters, Mary Ann
Metz and Martha Clayton. The plaintiff sought to set aside a deed executed
by Lillie in favor of the defendants. The property in question was Lillie's
one-third interest in a ranch that she and her two sisters had inherited from
their mother. Lillie had long been diabetic and her condition worsened dur-
ing 1977. In that year she executed a deed to her share of the ranch, naming
her two sisters as grantees. An attorney drew the deed but did not record it
until the date of Lillie's death in 1978.
The plaintiff pled for the imposition of a constructive trust on the property
conveyed to the sisters. 137 A finding that a constructive trust should be im-
posed would mandate that the sisters reconvey the property to Lillie's heir,
unless the defendants proved the existence of a bar, such as fraud against
131. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 436(14) (Vernon 1980) provides that a trust account means
an account in the name of one or more parties as trustees for one or more beneficiaries when
the relationship is established by the form of the account and the deposit agreement with the
financial institution and no subject of the trust exists other than the sums on deposit in the
account.
132. 656 S.W.2d at 682.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 682-83.
136. 674 S.W.2d 821 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
137. The court stated that such a trust was an equitable remedy, appropriate when a confi-
dential relationship exists between grantor and grantee and the grantor relies on the oral prom-
ise of the grantee to reconvey the property. Id. at 823.
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creditors.1 38 The defendants maintained that the plaintiff was not entitled to
a constructive trust because Lillie engaged in a fraudulent conveyance as a
matter of law. The record showed that Lillie believed it necessary to convey
the property to her sisters in order to collect Medicaid and social security
benefits. Mary Ann testified that she and Martha were told that Lillie could
not receive benefits as long as she owned the land.
The appellate court recognized that the directed verdict in favor of the
two sisters would have been proper if a fraudulent conveyance had oc-
curred.1 39 The defendants, however, did not prove actual fraud or an actual
creditor position of the government. Even if Lillie had thought she was en-
gaged in a fraudulent transaction, no proof of a fraudulent transaction had
been presented. The court could not ascertain from the record whether the
government was a creditor.14° Because no evidence proved a conveyance in
fraud of creditors, no bar to impressing the land with a constructive trust
was present. The court therefore ordered the defendants to execute a deed
conveying the land in question to John Stout.141
III. ESTATE ADMINISTRATION
Probate Court Jurisdiction. In recent years the most troubling issue in con-
troversies involving estates has been the jurisdictional questions raised by
sections 4 and 5 of the Texas Probate Code.' 42 Practitioners must often
make difficult choices as to the proper forum. As a result of the existing
confusion, litigation involving personal representatives may have to be deter-
mined on procedural grounds. Recent cases demonstrate the complexity
present in this area.
In Seay v. Hal' 43 Willie Rhoneta Seay brought a wrongful death and sur-
vival action against several defendants in a Dallas County district court for
the death of her husband from injuries received when a boiler safety valve
released scalding water and steam on him. Five days later she initiated the
same causes of action against the same defendants in the probate court of
Dallas County, in which administration of her husband's estate was pending.
The defendants moved to dismiss in the probate court, claiming that the
court lacked jurisdiction over both causes. Mrs. Seay argued that the pro-
bate court had jurisdiction over both causes of action under section 5 and 5A
of the Probate Code.'" The probate court ordered dismissal for want of
138. As authority for this proposition the court cites to Mills v. Gray, 147 Tex. 33, 39-40,
210 S.W.2d 985, 988-89 (1948). 674 S.W.2d at 824.
139. 674 S.W.2d at 826.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 4, 5 (Vernon 1980).
143. 677 S.W.2d 19 (Tex. 1984).
144. TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5(d) (Vernon 1980) provides that courts that exercise origi-
nal probate jurisdiction are empowered to hear all matters incident to an estate. Id. § 5A(b)
provides that when the jurisdiction of a probate court is concurrent with that of a district
court, causes of action "appertaining to estates" or "incident to an estate" are to be brought in
the probate court. Furthermore, section 5A(b) defines the phrases "appertaining to estates"




The court of appeals concluded that the probate court had jurisdiction
over the survival cause of action, but not over the wrongful death cause of
action. 145 Quoting the definition of personal property in section 3(z) of the
Probate Code, 14 6 it decided that the survival cause of action was an asset of
the estate, and thus a matter incident to the estate. 147 The court noted that a
cause of action for personal injury survives the death of the injured party
and may be asserted by the heirs or administrator on behalf of the estate. 148
On the other hand, a wrongful death action belongs to the statutory benefi-
ciaries, who may or may not be heirs or devisees of the decedent. 149 Thus,
such an action cannot be an estate asset, and the probate court had jurisdic-
tion over only the survival action. 150
The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's judgment that the
probate court had no jurisdiction over the wrongful death action, but re-
versed the judgment holding that the probate court did have jurisdiction
over the survival cause of action. 15 1 To reach its decision the court focused
on the breadth of three statutory terms: "appertaining to estates" and "inci-
dent to an estate,"' 52 "all matters relating to the settlement . . . of es-
tates" 153 and "claims." 154 After reviewing extensively the constitutional and
legislative history of the relevant provisions of the Probate Code, the court
set forth guidelines for construction of the three terms. It observed that the
first term was designed to limit probate court jurisdiction to matters in
[T]he probate of wills, the issuance of letters testamentary and of administra-
tion, and the determination of heirship, and also include, but are not limited to,
all claims by or against an estate, all actions for trial of title to land and for the
enforcement of liens thereon, all actions for trial of the right of property, all
actions to construe wills, the interpretation and administration of testamentary
trusts and the applying of constructive trusts, and generally all matters relating
to the settlement, partition, and distribution of estates of wards and deceased
persons.
Id. § 5A(b).
Section 3(c) defines "claims" to include "liabilities of a decedent which survive, including
taxes, whether arising in contract or in tort or otherwise, funeral expenses, the expense of a
tombstone, expenses of administration, estate and inheritance taxes, liabilities against the es-
tate of a minor or incompetent, and debts due such estates." Id. § 3(c).
145. 663 S.W.2d 468, 469 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983), rev'd, 677 S.W.2d 19 (Tex. 1984).
146. "'Personal property' includes interests in goods, money, choses in action ....
TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 3(z) (Vernon 1980) (emphasis added).
147. 663 S.W.2d at 470.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 472.
150. Id. at 472-73.
151. 677 S.W.2d at 20.
152. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5A(b) (Vernon 1980).
153. Id.
154. Id. § 3(c). The Texas Supreme Court in Seay distinguished two of its precedents,
English v. Cobb, 593 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. 1979), and Lucik v. Taylor, 596 S.W.2d 514 (Tex.
1980). English held that a county court at law handling probate matters had jurisdiction to
determine ownership to money in a savings account jointly in the name of the decedent and
her sister. 593 S.W.2d at 676. In Lucik an injunction that prohibited will contestants from
changing the form or location of the decedent's assets was upheld as being incident to an
estate. 596 S.W.2d at 516. The court noted that Seay did not involve any probate asset similar
to a savings account containing a fixed sum of money. 677 S.W.2d at 24.
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which the "controlling issue ... was the settlement, partition, or distribu-
tion of an estate." 55 It concluded that neither wrongful death nor survival
actions were intended to be matters appertaining to or incident to estates. 156
Second, it held that "claims" are limited to those of a liquidated nature.1 57
As a result, neither cause of action before the court constituted a claim by
the estate. 58 With respect to the third statutory phrase the court again
turned to the "controlling issue" standard, expressing approval of judicial
interpretations that permit a probate court to exercise jurisdiction when the
controlling issue of the action relates to settlement, partition, or distribution
of the estate.' 59 Neither cause of action could satisfy this test.' 6° As addi-
tional support for its decision, the court noted that the intent of the statutes
at issue was to utilize the special expertise of the statutory probate court
judges in handling matters appertaining to an estate.' 6' The court asserted
that personal injury litigation was not within this special domain. 162
Other recent decisions have wrestled with the jurisdiction of statutory
probate courts. In Nichols v. Prejean163 Warren W. Nichols, suing in his
capacity as independent executor, sought a temporary and permanent in-
junction enjoining one defendant from occupying or possessing certain real
property of an estate pending the administration of that estate. Nichols also
sought a return from that defendant of certain personal property that was
part of the estate. In addition Nichols sought to recover from a second de-
fendant certain sums to which the estate was entitled as a result of that de-
fendant's breach of fiduciary duties while acting as a guardian of the estate.
Finally, he sued to recover from two other defendants as sureties upon the
second defendant's bond as guardian. The district court granted the defend-
ants' plea in abatement to dismiss the suit, and the executor appealed. The
appellate court affirmed, holding that all the causes of action the executor
asserted fell within the term "matters incident to the estate'' 64 and that the
constitutional county court of San Augustine County had exclusive jurisdic-




159. Id. at 24.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. A case similar to Seay is Adams v. Calloway, 662 S.W.2d 423 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1983, no writ), which involved a tort action against R.W. Calloway as administrator of
the estate of Charles W. Adams. The action arose out of an airplane crash that killed Adams
and injured the plaintiff. The action was filed in a district court in Dallas County while pro-
bate was pending in a statutory probate court. The district court sustained the defendant's
plea in abatement with regard to the exclusive jurisdiction of the probate court. On appeal, the
plaintiff contended that an unliquidated tort claim does not fall within the ambit of matters
incident to the estate and so was properly brought in the district court. The appellate court
rejected that contention, stating that § 5A of the Probate Code covers all claims, both liqui-
dated and unliquidated, against an estate. Id. at 427. Consequently, the tort claim against the
estate had to be brought in the probate court. Id. The court relied in part on that aspect of the
court of appeals decision in Seay that was later reversed by the Texas Supreme Court. Id. at
426. Seay has resolved this particular jurisdictional question.
163. 673 S.W.2d 394 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1984, no writ).
164. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5(d) (Vernon 1980).
19851
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
tion to hear the cause of action as matters incident to the estate. 165
In Pullen v. Swanson 166 Gretchen S. Pullen sued Jeanelle Swanson, execu-
trix of the estate of J.F. Swanson, in a district court of Harris County to
collect on a series of promissory notes executed by the decedent. The dece-
dent's will was admitted to probate in a probate court in Harris County
before the collection suit was filed in district court. The defendant filed in
the district court a "Motion to Dismiss and/or Alternatively Plea in Abate-
ment." The district court granted the motion and abated the action, and
Pullen appealed. The appellant argued that the district court had original
jurisdiction over a suit to collect from an estate on promissory notes exe-
cuted by the deceased even if an estate proceeding is already pending in a
statutory probate court. The appellate court, however, asserted that the
plain language of section 5A equated "claims by or against an estate"'167
with the phrases "appertaining to estates" and "incident to an estate,"' 68
and therefore affirmed the district court's abatement. 169
In Farah v. Fashing170 William F. Farah as relator brought an action for
writ of mandamus against a judge of a county court at law in El Paso
County. Farah sought to set aside an order dismissing a third-party mal-
practice action that he had filed in a probate proceeding. Beneficiaries of the
estate had protested Farah's final accounting and filed a claim on behalf of
the estate, seeking a money judgment against him because of his alleged mis-
management of the estate. Farah had responded by filing in the same pro-
bate proceeding a third-party action for indemnity and contribution against
the attorneys who represented him in his capacity as administrator. He had
alleged that the actions challenged by the beneficiaries were carried out
under the guidance of the attorneys and that they should be liable to him for
indemnification or contribution should his actions be found improper. The
probate court had dismissed the third-party action for want of subject matter
jurisdiction.
The relator contended before the appellate court that the county court at
law had ancillary probate jurisdiction over matters "incident to an estate" '7
of a deceased. The appellate court relied on Lucik v. Taylor172 for its posi-
tion that section 5(d) of the Probate Code173 does confer ancillary jurisdic-
tion upon the county probate courts, but that the outcome of the additional
controversy must be "necessary" to the resolution of the particular estate. 174
The court saw no necessary relationship between Farah's recovery from the
attorneys and the augmentation of any estate assets flowing to the
165. 673 S.W.2d at 395-96.
166. 667 S.W.2d 359 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
167. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5A(b) (Vernon 1980).
168. Id.
169. 667 S.W.2d at 362-64.
170. 666 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1984, no writ).
171. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5(d) (Vernon 1980).
172. 596 S.W.2d 514, 516 (Tex. 1980). For discussion of Lucik, see supra note 154.
173. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5(d) (Vernon 1980).




With the decision of Seay v. Hall, 76 some of the confusion with respect to
jurisdiction may be abating. Seay made clear that wrongful death and sur-
vival actions are not "incident to an estate." If the courts follow the Texas
Supreme Court's dicta relating to claims and matters using the special exper-
tise of the statutory probate court, a touchstone in determining where juris-
diction lies will be created.
Secured Claims Against an Estate. Cessna Finance Corp. v. Morrison,177 a
case involving Cessna's secured claim against a decedent's estate over the
purchase of an airplane, demonstrates the necessity for care involving
claims. The decedent executed a promissory note and a conditional sales
contract with Cessna that provided for a deferred payment in eighty-four
monthly installments. In the sales transaction the seller reserved a security
interest that was assigned to Cessna along with the contract and note. The
decedent died in Bolivia, apparently as a result of the crash of the airplane.
Cessna filed a claim with Lucian L. Morrison, the administrator of the dece-
dent's estate, for the balance due on the secured debt. Morrison filed his
written objections to the claim, pointing out that the claim failed to specify
whether Cessna desired to have the claim allowed and approved as a ma-
tured secured claim under section 306(a)(1) of the Probate Code, to be paid
in due course of administration, or whether it desired to have the claim al-
lowed, approved, and fixed, under section 306(a)(2), as a preferred debt and
lien against a specific property securing the debt.178 In addition, the admin-
istrator rejected Cessna's claim in its entirety. He argued before the probate
court that, because Cessna had failed to specify an election under section
306(a), its claim should be treated as a preferred debt and lien claim against
the specific property. The probate court directed that Cessna's claim be clas-
sified as a preferred debt and lien claim limited to the aircraft comprising the
security for the debt.
Before the appellate court Cessna contended that, because its claim was
presented within the six-month period provided by section 298(a) of the Pro-
bate Code, 179 the probate court exceeded its powers in classifying the claim
175. Id.
176. 677 S.W.2d 19 (Tex. 1984); see supra text accompanying notes 143-62.
177. 667 S.W.2d 580 (Tex. App.-Houston (1st Dist.] 1984, no writ).
178. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 306(a) (Vernon 1980) provides:
(a) Specifications of Claim. When a secured claim against an estate is
presented, the claimant shall specify therein, in addition to all other matters
required to be specified in claims:
(1) Whether it is desired to have the claim allowed and approved as a ma-
tured secured claim to be paid in due course of administration, in which event it
shall be so paid if allowed and approved; or
(2) Whether it is desired to have the claim allowed, approved, and fixed as a
preferred debt and lien against the specific property securing the indebtedness
and paid according to the terms of the contract which secured the lien, in which
event it shall be so allowed and approved if it is a valid lien; provided, however,
that the personal representative may pay said claim prior to maturity if it is for
the best interest of the estate to do so.
179. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 298(a) (Vernon 1980).
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as a preferred debt and lien against the security. Cessna further contended
that the claim itself reflected an election to have the claim allowed as a ma-
tured secured claim for money payable out of the general assets of the estate.
Morrison pointed out that the secured creditor must make an affirmative
election within the six-month period following the original grant of letters;
otherwise, the claim is to be treated as a preferred debt and lien against the
specific security. The court of appeals sided with the administrator and held
that because Cessna did not make the affirmative election required by section
306(a) the probate court was authorized to treat the claim as a preferred
debt and lien against the specific property, as provided by section 306(b) of
the Probate Code.1 80 Cessna's claim did not affirmatively reflect an election
to proceed under section 306(a), even though the claim alleged on informa-
tion and belief that the aircraft had been lost or destroyed.' 8 ' The court
noted that the administrator had timely filed its objections to the claim, but
Cessna made no effort thereafter to amend or supplement the claim to indi-
cate the required election.182 As a result of this decision Cessna was left
with nothing but a substantially worthless preferred lien against the wrecked
plane.
Judgment Against an Executor. The family dispute in Montgomery v. Ken-
nedy18 3 centered on a bill of review to set aside a prior agreed judgment.
Virginia Lou Wilkinson Montgomery and her minor children sued her
brother Jack B. Wilkinson, Jr. and her mother Virginia McEntire Kennedy,
who were co-independent executors and trustees of a trust created in 1969
under the will of Virginia Lou's father. The will directed that one-fourth of
the residuary estate be placed in a trust with Virginia Lou as beneficiary and
with her children eventually to receive whatever remained of the trust
corpus. By 1974 Jack Jr. had not yet funded the testamentary trust, and
Virginia Lou consulted her attorney. The attorneys for Virginia Lou and
Jack Jr. sought an amicable solution. Without formal discovery procedures
Virginia Lou's attorney was given access to documents from the estate's files
in Jack Jr.'s office. When the attorney visited the office in September of
1974, the brother did not disclose the existence of new assets and dealings in
the estate, and his attorneys furnished balance sheets and income statements
that were no longer current. The negotiations eventually produced a com-
promise figure of $350,000 for Virginia Lou and her children. In order to
make the settlement binding on the minor children, a "friendly" suit was
filed, and the settlement was incorporated in an agreed judgment. After the
judgment Virginia Lou discovered an oil and gas lease that had not been
disclosed in September 1974. She then filed the bill of review to set the judg-
ment aside.
The Texas Supreme Court recognized that a bill of review to set aside a
former judgment would be justified when that judgment was obtained by
180. 667 S.W.2d at 583.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. 669 S.W.2d 309 (Tex. 1984).
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fraud. 184 Only extrinsic fraud, however, as opposed to intrinsic fraud, would
entitle Virginia Lou and her children to bill of review relief.18 5 The court
took note of its long-standing position that in the context of a fiduciary's
duty of full disclosure, in a suit to partition or divide assets the fraudulent
concealment of an asset constitutes extrinsic fraud, and a court will therefore
set aside its former judgment in an equitable proceeding. 186 Consequently,
the court held that the fraud at issue was extrinsic and remanded the cause
to the trial court. 187
184. Id. at 312.
185. Id. Extrinsic fraud is collateral in that the fraud must be collateral to the matter
actually tried and not a matter that was actually or potentially at issue in the trial. Id. at 312-
13 (citing Crouch v. McGaw (Panama Ref. Co.), 134 Tex. 633, 639, 138 S.W.2d 94, 97 (1940)).
Intrinsic fraud, on the other hand, occurs when the fraudulent acts relate to an issue involved
in the original action, or when those acts were litigated or could have been litigated therein.
669 S.W.2d at 313 (citing Mills v. Baird, 147 S.W.2d 312, 316 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1941,
writ refd)).
186. 669 S.W.2d at 313. The highest court distinguished a bill of review in which the
alleged specific fraudulent acts were known and in issue, in which event the fraud is intrinsic.
Id. at 313-14.
187. Id. at 314.
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